In this article we develop a method for conflict management within Dempster-Shafer theory. The idea is that each piece of evidence is discounted in proportion to the degree that it contributes to the conflict. This way the contributors of conflict are managed on a case-by-case basis in relation to the problem they cause. Discounting is performed in a sequence of incremental steps, with conflict updated at each step, until the overall conflict is brought down exactly to a predefined acceptable level.
Introduction
In this article we develop a method for conflict management within Dempster-Shafer theory [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] where it is assumed that all belief functions are referring to the same problem or alternatively that they are false.
In general a high degree of conflict is seen as if there is a representation error in the frame of discernment, while a small conflict may be the result of measuring errors.
One type of representation error resulting in high conflict is when belief functions concerning different subproblems that should be handled independently are erroneously combined [9, 10] . When this is the case the assumption that all belief functions combined must refer to the same problem (not different subproblems) is violated.
We may interpret the conflict as metalevel evidence stating that at least one piece of evidence in the combination should not be part of that combination. By temporarily removing (and replacing) each belief function from the combination, one at a time, we induce a drop in conflict. This is used to derive metalevel evidence regarding each individual belief function indicating that this particular belief function does not belong to the problem in question.
When assuming that there is only one problem at hand, such metalevel evidence must be interpreted as a proposition about the falsity of this belief function. A normalization of the drop in conflict will be shown to be the degree of falsity of that belief function.
However, instead of directly discounting each piece of evidence to its individual degree of falsity we take an incremental step in that direction for all belief functions. Based on these initial discounts we recalculate conflict and update all degrees of falsities. The process is performed sequentially until a predefined level of maximal acceptable conflict is reached. With this sequential approach we obtain a smooth discounting process (compared to if we would have fully discounted each belief function to its degree of falsity) and we are able to exactly match any level of acceptable conflict without risk of overshooting.
An alternative way to manage the conflict is to assume that there are different subproblems where the set of basic belief assignments (bbas) may be distributed to different clusters that should be handled separately [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] [16] [17] [18] .
Another approach also using meta-knowledge regarding the reliability of the source is contextual discounting [19] . It is also possible to develop alternative distance measures between bodies of evidence [21, 22] . In [22] Jousselme and Maupin compare several different distance measures. It is important to observe that different measures may measure different types of distances. Some distance measures measure the degree to which two bodies of evidence are different, while others such as conflict, measure the degree to which they are incompatible. For example, two propositions (corresponding to two focal elements) ''a red car'' and ''a fast car'' are different, but may be fully compatible if there is a red fast car in the frame of discernment.
A recent paper [23] also uses the idea of sequential discount to manage the conflict when combining belief functions. However, they use a distance measure by Jousselme et al. [20] that measures dissimilarity.
A recent overview of different alternatives for conflict management when combining conflicting belief functions was given by Smets, see [24] .
In Section 2 we investigate the degree of falsity of a piece of evidence. In Section 3 we develop a method of sequential incremental discounting using the degree of falsity. We perform an experiment to investigate the behavior of an algorithm for conflict management in Section 4. Finally, conclusions are drawn in Section 5.
Degree of falsity
Let us recapitulate the interpretation of conflict as if there is at least one piece of evidence that violates the representation given by the frame of discernment, and thus can be said not to belong to the set of bbas that refer to this problem v [10] .
A conflict in v is thus interpreted as a piece of metalevel evidence that there is at least one piece of evidence that does not belong to the subset 
We will derive the basic belief number (bbn) m Dv (e q R v) by stating that the belief in the proposition that there is at least one piece of evidence that does not belong to v, $j. e j R v, should be equal no matter whether we base that belief on the original piece of metalevel evidence, before e q is taken out from v, or on a combination of the other two pieces of metalevel evidence Bel DvÈðvÀfeqgÞ 9j: 
This is the degree of falsity of e q under the assumption that we are dealing with one problem, not several different subproblems.
Sequential incremental discounting
In this section we investigate how to manage the conflict on an individual case-by-case basis using the degree of falsity.
If m Dv (e q R v) = 1 then e q is certainly false and must not be used in the combination. This becomes the situation when c (0,0) = 1, for any c (0,q) < 1. For c (0,q) = 1 we define m Dv (e q R v) = 0 as the proposition is not supported when conflict remains unchanged, equal to 1. When m Dv (e q R v) = 0 then we have no indication regarding the falsity of e q and will take no additional action. This is the situation when we observe no change in conflict c . When 0 < m Dv (e q R v) < 1, then e q contributes to the overall conflict and its conflict contribution must be managed. We would then like to pay less regard to a piece of evidence the higher the degree is that it is false, pay no attention to it when it is certainly false, and leave it unchanged when there is no indication as to its falsity. This can be done by using the discounting operation. The discounting operation was introduced to handle the case when the source of some piece of evidence is lacking in credibility [4] . The credibility of the source, a, also became the credibility of the piece of evidence. The situation was handled by discounting each supported proposition other than H with the credibility a and by adding the discounted mass to H;
We will use the same discounting operation in this case when there is a direct indication for each separate piece of evidence regardless of which source produced it.
As the degree of falsity of e q is proportional to the conflict that e q contributes to the overall conflict we discount it using its credibility. The conflict in Dempster's rule when combining all pieces of evidence regarding e q , as identical to one minus the credibility of the evidence; 
The combinations of all bbas in Eq. (12) (10) we now obtain the sought after discounted bbas at the next step d + 1.
In each situation the bbas are sequentially discounted by repeated use of Eqs. (10) and (12), followed by combination using Eqs. (13)-(15), see Fig. 1 .
In Algorithm 1 we describe an algorithm for performing sequential incremental discounting of all bbas.
The maximum conflict allowed is considered to be a domain dependent parameter.
An experiment
In this section we conduct an experiment with ten bbas over a frame of discernment with three elements and seven possible focal elements. We study the combination of the bbas and the use of conflict management through their sequential discounting using the degree of falsity and a gain factor of e = 0.1. In an experiment with higher gain factors (not shown), e.g., e = 0.3, the curves of m d v evidently become step-wise linear. Each bba has a random number of focal elements n q 2 [1, j2
, where the number n q is drawn with a uniform probability within the interval. The n q focal elements are then drawn with an uniform probability p = 1/(j2 H j À 1) from the set 2 H À fHg. With probability 1 we include H in the bba. Each focal element is given a random bbn drawn uniformly from [0, b], b 6 1, where b is chosen such that the bbns sum up to 1. As these bbas are constructed randomly, they are not constructed with any particular problem in sight; they are bound to be highly conflicting and a challenging test case. Let us observe the process of sequential incremental discounting. At each step d in the sequential discounting we calculate the degree of falsity for all bbas. However, instead of discounting each bba to its full degree of falsity In Fig. 3 we observe the conflict when we combine the ten bbas with Dempster's rule after different numbers of successively performed incremental discounts.
We notice an initial steady decline in conflict which is later somewhat moderated. As the conflict may be interpreted as a piece of metalevel evidence that there is something wrong with the representation of the problem we should at least request a conflict less or equal to 0.5. This level is reached after 42 incremental discounts. In Fig. 4 we observe the sequential incremental discounting factor a In Fig. 7 we notice how the preferred hypothesis changes with sequential discounting as bbas which are highly conflicting have a high degree of falsity and are more strongly discounted than others. Here, the two hypotheses that initially were 1st and 3rd, become 2nd and 1st at the 42nd sequential discount (the 50% conflict level). We notice that this change in preference order takes place at the 20th sequential discount around the 70% conflict level. Thus, in practice k can be fairly high.
In Fig. 8 we observe for comparison direct discounting of each piece of evidence to its individual degree of falsity. In comparison with the sequential approach in Fig. 7 we notice that this corresponds roughly to the 20th sequential discount with a rather high 70% remaining conflict. In this example, this is also the point where the preferences order change. Thus, using sequential discounting that brings down the overall conflict somewhat further, e.g., towards the 50% level, obtains a stable preference order among the different alternatives.
Thus, sequential discounting is superior to direct discounting in that it can bring down the conflict to any predefined level, or be observed during the discounting process in order to find a stable preference order among alternatives.
In Table 1 we compare discounting with basic averaging of all mass functions. In column 2 we find È m 
Let us (in Table 2 ) observe the preference order of the top three preferred focal elements tabulated in Table 1 . We notice a small change in preference order between discounting and no discounting. However, the fundamental difference is noticed between that of all combination vs. averaging where the preference order is completely different. With combination of belief functions (with or without discounting) we prefer a singleton, with averaging H is the preferred focal element. In an experiment with 2500 sequential discounts we notice that when d ? 1 then m d q ðHÞ ! 1 slowly in a logarithm-like way, Fig. 9 .
As information is lost by discounting it may be viewed as a necessary evil in order to manage the conflict (when this is high). Obviously, if a poor representation of the problem at hand (through the frame of discernment) is the cause of the conflict rather than poorly represented input data, we should change the frame of discernment. We measure the information lost by studying entropy measures as the sequential discounting progresses.
We prefer to see basic belief masses that are focused on as few and as small focal elements as possible. This can be measured by generalizing Shannon's entropy [25] and Hartley's information [26] measures, respectively. We will use a measure of aggregated uncertainty (AU) that takes both types of uncertainty into account.
The aggregated uncertainty functional AU is defined as
where {p x } x2H is the set of all probability distributions such that p for all A # H. AU was independently discovered by several authors about the same time [27] [28] [29] .
Abellán et al. [30] suggested that AU could be disaggregated in separate measures of nonspecificity and scattering that generalize Hartley information [26] and Shannon entropy [25] , respectively. Dubois and Prade [31] defined such a measure of nonspecificity as where F # 2 H is the set of focal elements. From Eqs. (21) and (24) we may define a generalized Shannon entropy [30] as
An algorithm for computing AU was found by Meyerowitz et al. [32] . For the sake of completeness we cite the algorithm here, in the way it is described by Harmanec et al. [33] , Fig. 10 . This measure reduces to Shannon's entropy [25] when m d v represents a probability distribution (i.e., "A. jAj = 1) and to Hartley's information [26] Fig. 11 we observe the entropy of m d v at different stages d of the sequential discounting. We observe a rapid increase in aggregated uncertainty in the unnormalized case as mass is transferred towards H as discounting progresses, red line. For the normalized case we observe entropy quickly reaching close to its theoretical maximum of log 2 (jHj) which is 1.585 for jHj = 3. We observe an increase in Hartley information I m throughout the discounting process we observe the same effect but with a later peak for GS m As is apparent from Fig. 7 the loss of information by discounting does not make the analysis difficult. Rather it makes the conclusions that may be drawn from the combination of discounted belief functions more reliable, as the conflict is reduced. For instance, after 20 sequential discounts (see Fig. 7 ) the preference order of supported focal elements becomes stable (in the region of reasonable discounting).
Conclusions
We have demonstrated that we can successfully manage the conflict of Dempster's rule by making well motivated and precise discounting of all belief functions. Such discounting is made individually for each belief function in proportion to its degree of falsity. We show that by performing the discounting process in a series of incremental steps we can reach any predefined acceptable level of conflict. In an experiment we find that this discounting does not normally make it more difficult to identify the most supported proposition. Rather it makes the selection process of the preferred proposition more robust when highly conflicting pieces of evidence are discounted down to a level they deserve. 
